

Proconsuls and CINCs from the Roman Republic to the Republic of the United States of America: Lessons for the Pax Americana

**A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

Proconsuls and CINCs from the Roman Republic to the Republic of the United States of America: Lessons for the Pax Americana by Major Jeffrey A. Bradford, U.S. Army, 48 pages.

Political and media pundits have labeled the current period of post Cold-War world order the Pax Americana, reminiscent of the Pax Romana that occurred from 27 BC- 180 AD, during the zenith of the Roman Empire. It is the view of many that since the U.S. is the sole superpower in the world, the next few decades or years will be a time of great growth and tranquility, under the leadership and protection of the United States of America. While the U.S. has a unique role and opportunity within the world, it does not possess the same ways and means of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries.

Many other parallels to the Roman Empire have again made their way in to the modern political lexicon. Dana Priest, a staff writer for the Washington Post, recently wrote a three article series in September 2000, declaring the U.S. Theater Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) to be the equivalent of Roman Proconsuls during the Roman Empire.

Roman Proconsuls served as the Roman governor and commander-in-chief of the military forces within his designated province. The functions of the office underwent changes during the Republic and Imperial eras of Rome, but one thing never changed. Success meant that Roman influence and expansion would continue throughout the world, but his failure meant the diminishing of Roman power.

The position of the modern-day U.S. Theater CINC seems to be similar to the Roman Proconsul. Given America's position in the post Cold-War world, these men are America's military, and sometimes, pseudo-political representatives to the world. Their success or failure could have significant consequences for America's position in the world. The ways and means today however, are much different than in the days of the Roman Empire.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the evolution of the Roman Proconsuls and compare them to modern-era U.S. Theater CINCs to determine what made them effective. It will then compare the global situation in the Roman world and today in order to answer the question: Are there similarities and differences between being an effective Roman Proconsul and an effective modern-era U.S. Theater CINC?

This monograph concluded while there are some similarities between Proconsuls and CINCs on a personal level, there are many more differences within the governmental systems. If the U.S. is to maximize its power and influence in the coming years, the CINCs will have an important role to play. Operating within the current system, CINCs are maximizing their effectiveness. Any problems with maintaining U.S. influence in the world can not be blamed on the CINCs. The problems will occur in the U.S. national security establishment, which needs to be restructured in order to maximize its effectiveness.

The combining of all the instruments of national power within the Proconsuls served Rome well. The U.S. system of civilian control of the military will prevent that from ever happening. What is needed, is a revitalization of the entire National Security Structure and Strategy, fully integrating all the instruments of national power for the benefit of the U.S. and the world. Only then can we expect to have and enjoy a Pax Americana.

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INTRODUCTION

Political and media pundits have labeled the current period of post Cold-War world order the Pax Americana, reminiscent of the Pax Romana that occurred from 27 BC- 180 AD, during the zenith of the Roman Empire. It is the view of many that since the U.S. is the sole superpower in the world, the next few decades or years will be a time of great growth and tranquility, under the leadership and protection of the United States of America. This is false and misleading. The U.S. is not the sole protector and providers for the world as the Romans were in antiquity. Many different regions and countries provide much to the global environment. While the U.S. has a unique role and opportunity within the world, it does not possess the same ways and means of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries.

Many other parallels to the Roman Empire have again made their way in to the modern political lexicon. Ms. Dana Priest, a staff writer for the Washington Post, recently wrote a three article series about U.S. Theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) in September 2000, declaring that "the CINCs (pronounced "sinks") have evolved into the modern-day equivalent of the Roman Empire's Proconsuls--well funded, semi-autonomous, unconventional centers of U.S. foreign policy."¹ The Central Command Foreign Policy Advisor initially coined the term according to General Anthony Zinni, former CINC of U.S. Central Command.² Ms. Priest stated that the CINCs wield considerable foreign policy clout, and possess huge budgets that are hidden from

¹ Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?" *Washington Post*, 28 September 2000, sec. A, p. 1.

² General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni, Interview by author, 26 March 2001, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, telephone conversation, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1.

Congress intentionally.³ The CINCs also expressed their various ideas on policy and military issues within their "CINCdoms." In the third article, Priest declared that "the CINCs command so much respect in their theaters and in Washington that they often shape foreign relations strategy."⁴ Priest makes these comparisons to the CINCs as Proconsuls, but what exactly was a Roman Proconsul and how much power and influence did they have in the Roman world as compared to the power of a modern-era U.S. Theater CINC.

Roman Proconsuls combined both political and military function. He was the chief magistrate and commander-in-chief of the military forces within his designated province. The term 'province' is derived from the Latin term 'provincia' which meant 'a range of duties'. Later the term was applied to the terrain the governor was responsible for.⁵ The functions of the office underwent changes during the Republic and Imperial eras of Rome, but one thing never changed. Success meant that Roman influence and expansion would continue throughout the world, but his failure meant the diminishing of Roman power.

The position of the modern-day U.S. Theater CINC has a lot of similarities to the Roman Proconsul. Given America's position in the post Cold-War world, these men are America's military, and sometimes, pseudo-political representatives to the world. Their success or failure could have significant consequences for America's position in the world. The ways and means today however, are much different than in the days of the Roman Empire.

³ Priest, 28 September 2000, sec. A, p. 18.

⁴ Dana Priest, "Standing up to State and Congress." *Washington Post*, 30 September 2000, sec. A, p. 1.

⁵ Isaac Asimov, *The Roman Republic* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), 83.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the evolution of the Roman Proconsuls and compare them with modern-era U.S. Theater CINC to determine what made them effective. It will then compare the global situation in the Roman world and today in order to answer the question: Are there similarities and differences between being an effective Roman Proconsul and an effective modern-era U.S. Theater CINC?

This monograph will analyze the evolution of the Roman Proconsul from its genesis during the Republic and the Empire, and why it was needed. The characteristics, ideas, and systems that made Roman Proconsuls effective will be analyzed. First, Scipio Africanus, Proconsul of Spain and Sicily during the days of the Republic, and the victor over Hannibal in the 2d Punic War will be analyzed. Secondly, Gnaeus Julius Agricola, Legate of Britain during the Empire, will be the subject of analysis.

Next the separation of the political and military functions within the U.S. government will be analyzed. Beginning in the late 18th and early 19th century, the increasing technology and professionalism of the armed forces began the divide between the political and military leader. The problems of the Roman Republic also influenced the structure of the American government during its early years. The Founding Fathers of the United States wrote about this extensively and ensured civilian control of the military was paramount within the Constitution of the United States of America. This greatly furthered the civil-military divide. Clausewitz's discussion on the nature of war will be discussed, specifically; "War is an extension of policy by other means". It will highlight the fact that policy and war are one in the same, and should not be separated by any means.

Finally, the monograph will trace the formation of the Unified Command Plan. The current U.S. National Security Strategy will provide the foundation to analyze the current global situation and what the CINCs role is in it. Comments from former CINCs on characteristics, ideas, and the systems required to be an effective CINC, will provide a modern four-star viewpoint. Comparison of the similarities and differences of Roman Proconsuls and U.S. CINCs will conclude the monograph.

CHAPTER ONE

EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN PROCONSUL

Why, ... should I sacrifice some of my men, even for a victory? Why should I allow the troops who have done me such excellent service to be wounded? Why, in fine, should I tempt providence? - especially as I know that a good commander should be able to gain as much by policy as by the sword. Besides, I am stirred by pity for the citizens whom I see must be killed; I would rather gain my ends without any harm befalling them.⁶

Caesar, *The Civil Wars*

Proconsuls of the Roman Republic

After the expulsion of the last Tarquin King from Rome in 509 BC, the Roman Republic was founded, and a new political system was divided between three major ruling elements, the assembly of the people, the Consuls, and the Senate. The assembly of the people included the Curiate assembly (*Comitia Curiata*), the Century assembly (*Comitia Centuriata*), the assembly of Tribes (*Comitia Tributa*), and added in 471 BC, the Plebian Council (*Concilia Plebis*). The assemblies as a whole selected the two Consuls from the Senate, and bestowed their legal powers to them.

The Consuls exercised full *imperium* (the power to command which included civil, military, and judicial power) or kingly powers. They could undertake any civil or military operation that fell within their sphere of influence. They led the armies in war, and were the supreme judges and executive officers of the State. The difference between the Consuls and a King was that Consuls were only in office for one year, and had to act in a collegial manner.⁷ They did not possess unchallenged authority. The Consulship was a 'first among equals' type relationship with the Senate.

⁶ Caesar, *The Civil War*, Translated by Jane F. Gardner (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1967), 71.

⁷ T. M. Taylor, *A Constitutional and Political History of Rome* (London: Methuen and Co., 1899), 41.

The Senate, under the Tarquin Kings, was strictly an informal body of advisors, chosen by the king, and consulted with on important affairs of state. The selected individuals held the position for life and became very important within the community. Once the Republic was founded, the Senate became a more independent body. Because of changing Consuls every year, it became an accepted practice for all ex-Consuls to join the Senate. This practice greatly enhanced the influence and prestige of the Senate. It became an accepted principle that all proposals submitted to the people should pass through the Senate first. Also, any act that might have a permanent effect on the community, such as making treaties, needed the Senate's consent and ratification.⁸

As Rome began expanding its territory and influence, the Senate wanted to maintain its power and prestige, hence the formation of the office of the Proconsul. This newly designated office initially helped to maintain that strength. A check on the Proconsul's *imperium* was that it was effective only within his designated province. Once he left the province, his *imperium* was relinquished. This also helped to maintain the power of the Senate.

The office of Promagistrate in the Roman Republic was introduced in 327 BC. During the Samnite Wars, Q. Publilius Philo had not completed the campaign against the Greek colony of Neopolis in southern Italy, before his year as Consul was over. In order to provide continuity for the military campaign and limit the number of Consuls in Rome, the senate proclaimed him '*pro consule*' (in the place of a consul) and allowed him to retain his *imperium*. It became evident that the previous system of only having two generals to conduct military operations was not adequate. The Senate did not want to

⁸ Taylor, 49.

change the current system of electing new Consuls each year, so the Proconsul office was established.⁹

The men selected to be Proconsuls were highly educated and very experienced men. To achieve the office, they had to progress through the *Cursus Honorum*, which was a series of political offices in Republican Rome. It defined age limits and the rules for progressing to higher offices. Individuals progressed from Quaestor (Financial magistrate), to Aedile (City Mayor), to Praetor (Judge), and then to Consul (Chief magistrate). Each candidate had to wait ten years before seeking another term in the same office and five years before seeking a higher office, which they usually spent as a member of the Senate, thereby gaining more experience and insight into government.¹⁰

After Rome defeated Carthage in the First Punic War, the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, became new provinces of Rome. This presented the Romans with a unique problem. Up until this time, Rome had only had to deal with Italian problems. The Consuls had supreme power throughout Italy, but the islands were not part of Italy. It was decided to send a new Praetor to govern Sicily and one to govern Sardinia and Corsica. They still had *imperium*, but did not control the financial aspects of the province. The finances were controlled by Quaestors sent by the Roman Senate.¹¹

A distinct departure from the Roman system evolved at this time. Instead of requiring the new provinces to supply an armed levy to support military campaigns, Rome began taxing the provincials. This established a distinct demarcation line between

⁹ Taylor, 127.

¹⁰ Greg Ong, "The Roman Republican System," From the *Roman History Essays Index*. Database on-line. Available from <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Academy/9040/cursus.html>. Internet. Accessed 20 December 2000, 1.

¹¹ Taylor, 200. The author specifies a Praetor was sent to govern these provinces. In later years the title changed to a Proprætor (in the place of a prætor).

Italy and the provinces. The former provided troops for the Army; the latter provided taxes to pay for it. As more provinces were added in later years, the same system was adopted for these as well. Each became an Italian territory governed by a Roman magistrate and paying taxes to Rome.¹²

In later years, as more provinces were added by Roman conquests including Spain, Macedonia, Africa, Asia, Narbo and Cilicia. New Praetors were not created for these provinces. The Senate extended the *imperium* of Consuls and Praetors, and sent them to govern these provinces as Proconsuls or Proprators. In war, victorious commanders were also declared *Imperator* (Commander-in-Chief) by their troops, but this was just an honorary title at this time. This is loosely translated today as Emperor.

The problem with this system is that selection to these positions did not require a popular election, but depended on the whims of the Senate, who used this to their advantage.¹³ Once sent to these provinces, the Senate and Consuls exercised very little, if any control over the affairs of the province. The two-elected Consuls authority only extended to Italy. The Consuls and Senate relied on the Proconsuls and Proprators to ensure that taxes were collected and sent to Rome on time. The provincial governors took advantage of the system and began oppressing the people under their control. The Roman governor in many cases resembled a Persian Satrap as opposed to a Republican magistrate. A Persian Satrap was a provincial governor in the Persian Empire. They became "independent monarchs, assuming all the power and most of the attributes which properly belonged to the sovereign, and yielding but a nominal fealty." Such was the case

¹² Taylor, 201.

¹³ Ibid., 202.

with some Proconsuls.¹⁴ After a time, it became customary to send Proconsuls instead of Proprators, to provinces where military campaigns were to be conducted.¹⁵

The provincial system started to break down after 146 BC. Throughout the extended Republic, corruption and extortion were the rule. Many Consuls and Praetors, if they were a favorite of the Senate, were sent to govern a wealthy province with the intent to 'line their pockets' while there. The Quaestors, who should have been a check against them, were usually co-opted into the service of the Proconsuls and Proprators, and considered unloyal if they spoke out against them.¹⁶

The great expansion of the Roman Republic also prompted a change in the military. In 108 BC, Gaius Marius assumed the consulship and in time enacted reforms to change the military structure. The transition from the manipular to the cohortal system was significant. The existing system of land ownership and conscription ended. Any Roman could now volunteer for the legions. The need for a large professional army to control all the provinces was paramount. This professionalization of the army led to a bond developing between a legionary and his general because the general promised him land and riches, not the Senate. Good generals possessed a strong military force that answered their every beck and call. Furthermore, the promise of land and riches after military service tied the legions to their commander, not to Rome.¹⁷ This significantly lessened the influence of the Senate over any ambitious generals.

¹⁴ Theodore A. Dodge, *Alexander* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 59.

¹⁵ Taylor, 202.

¹⁶ Ibid., 205.

¹⁷ Leon Homo, *Roman Political Institutions from City to State* (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1962), 162.

The civil war that followed was fought between the forces of Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who finally defeated Marius in 84 BC. He appointed himself Dictator, not for six months as per the Roman constitution, but for as long as he saw fit, with unlimited powers to reshape the constitution. He enacted many laws, the *Leges Corneliae*, designed to restore the traditions of the Republic, but these had the opposite effect.¹⁸

He ensured the Promagistrate office was officially written into legislation as part of his provincial laws, and increased the number of promagistracies to ten in order to equal the number of provinces. Cisalpine Gaul had been added as a province by this time.

He also decreed that no Legions would remain in Italy because Italy had suffered too much from them during the civil war. This was the most disastrous of the laws. Since all the legions were outside of Italy, the Consuls had no army at their disposal. The Proconsuls became much more powerful.¹⁹

Under Sulla, the Proconsul's and propraetor's *imperium* was indefinitely prolonged. This way, a Proconsul could be kept at his post until another designated person arrived to relieve him of command. Proconsul powers still did not extend into Italy, and a Proconsul had to lay down his powers to enter Italy. The problem with this point of the law is that a general with a trained, loyal, and ready army at his back might not follow it.²⁰ By 70 BC, the power of the Senate and the Republican constitution were in shambles, and the seeds had been sown for a military takeover.

¹⁸ Stewart Perowne, *Death of the Roman Republic* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), 108.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

²⁰ Taylor, 300.

Understanding the characteristics, ideas, and systems that made Proconsuls effective during the Republic will provide a basis of comparison with the CINCs. Publius Cornelius Scipio 'Africanus', the Proconsul in Spain and Sicily in the 2nd Punic War when the Republic was at its height, will be first subject of analysis.

Publius Cornelius Scipio 'Africanus'

Scipio was born into a patrician family in 236 BC. His father, also named Publius Cornelius, was a consul in 218 BC during the opening battles of the 2d Punic War. Publius the elder served as a Proconsul in Spain until his death in 211 BC.²¹ During this time, he wrote to his son about Spain, civil matters, and of course, military matters. This undoubtedly helped to shape young Scipio and prepare him for future events.

Many ancient chroniclers claim Scipio's success to be only a matter of good fortune and a bit of luck. Scipio did use the ploy of "divine guidance" to help inspire his soldiers to greater glory, but his actions and strategic insight present a very different picture.²²

Scipio was considered a very humane and generous individual. "He was astute and discreet, and possessed a mind which was always concentrated upon the purpose he had in view," according to Polybius.²³ One of Scipio's first battles occurred at the Battle of the River Ticinus. Polybius writes of his bravery and intelligence.

He was only seventeen years old and was taking part in his first campaign. The elder Scipio had put his son in command of a picked troop of horse to ensure the boy's safety, but when the latter caught sight of his father in the thick of the action surrounded by the enemy, dangerously wounded and with only two or three horsemen near him, he at first tried to urge the rest of his troop to ride to the rescue. Then, when he found they were hanging back because of the overwhelming number

²¹ H.H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), 27.

²² Polybius, *The Rise of the Roman Empire* (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 405.

²³ Ibid.

of the enemy around them, he is said to have charged by himself with reckless daring against the encircling cavalry....and the general, finding himself thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to salute his son as his rescuer in front of the whole army.²⁴

Scipio had been accused of trusting his success to luck and good fortune. In later years, he took great pains not to expose himself to unnecessary risk. This is not the mark of a general that trusts his success to luck, but one that displays great intelligence and motivational skills.²⁵

Scipio displayed the fortitude and courage of a future general immediately following the debacle at Cannae, when Hannibal smashed two Roman armies. He was one of four military tribunes and 4,000 survivors who fought their way out of the massacre to Canusium. Being one of the senior members, command of the small unit fell to him and another tribune. Scipio soon learned that other young nobles were planning on deserting Rome and were forecasting doom on the city. Scipio rode with a few followers to a meeting of the young nobles. He pulled his sword from its sheath, and brandishing it at the nobles, swore never to desert Rome, at which time he made the nobles swear allegiance also. They all did. Scipio then took his force to the consul Varro, who they learned, had survived the battle and reached Venusia.²⁶

Scipio's ascendancy to the Proconsulship of Spain is a strange chain of events in itself. When Scipio's father and uncle were killed in Spain in 211 BC, Rome sent Gaius Claudius Nero, as propraetor to govern Spain. In 210 BC, when the commands were being considered, no one stood to accept the command of Spain. The People of the assembly in Rome decided to give it to Scipio. It is not known why no one else stood for

²⁴ Polybius, *Rise*, 405.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Scullard, *Scipio*, 29.

the command, and why the Senate gave Scipio the opportunity, for he had not progressed through the *Cursus Honorum* according to Roman law. Scipio gladly accepted the command and moved quickly to begin the conquest of Spain from the Carthaginians. Part of his zeal may have been revenge for the death of his father and uncle. Scullard writes, "the appointment marks an important stage in Rome's constitutional development. Scipio, who had not been praetor or consul, was thus the first *privatus* (a private individual as distinct from a magistrate) to be invested with Proconsular *imperium*, on which later rested the military authority of the emperors of Rome."²⁷ Scipio's appointment to the command in Spain was the turning point of the 2d Punic War. His success in Spain began Rome's ascendancy to Empire.

Upon arriving in Spain, Scipio captured the key Carthaginian base of New Carthage, where he showed his deft touch at dealing with conquered peoples by enlisting them to his cause. Livy writes,

Having sent for the hostages, Scipio urged everybody, hostages and prisoners, to keep a good heart, reminding them that they had fallen into the hands of the Romans, a people who preferred to bind men by gratitude rather than by fear, and to have foreign nations linked with them by the ties of loyalty and a common purpose, not kept, like slaves, in cruel subjection.²⁸

Scipio took strides to see that the family members of CeltIberian nobles and Chieftains were cared for properly. He knew these people would be a great source of power for him if they could be swayed to his cause. His generous treatment of these hostages and prisoners had that exact effect on the local populace, and many nobles and chieftains came to support the Romans. Polybius writes, "it is a great feat to steer a policy to a

²⁷ Scullard, *Scipio*, 32.

²⁸ Livy, *The War with Hannibal*, Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt (New York: Penguin Books, 1965), 420.

successful conclusion or to overcome one's enemies in a campaign, but it requires a great deal more skill and caution to make good use of such triumphs."²⁹

Scipio not only understood people, but also was masterful in maximizing his limited resources. When he was given the Proconsulship of Sicily, with the authority to proceed to Africa if he felt it was in Rome's best interest, he was short of manpower. He levied 300 Sicilian nobles as cavalry, but was wary of their commitment to the war. He promised each of them an exemption as long as they gave their equipment to the substitute Scipio would find to replace them. They also had to train the replacement in the use of arms. Each of the nobles readily agreed and Scipio provided 300 hand picked Romans to serve as the replacements. Using this method, Scipio was able to acquire 300 dedicated Roman cavalymen for his army at no expense to Rome.³⁰

His greatest coup, however, was his treatment of the nephew of the Numidian prince, Masinissa. After capturing Masinissa's nephew in Spain, Scipio treated him like royalty, and returned the young man to his family unharmed. Masinissa was a staunch supporter of Hannibal and provided the Carthaginians a superb cavalry arm. Scipio's treatment of Masinissa's nephew, however, would win Masinissa over to the Roman cause. This proved vital to Roman success in Africa in 202 BC at the Battle of Zama, where Scipio finally defeated Hannibal.³¹

After his victory, Scipio took proper care to ensure that lasting peace was secured. He proposed very lenient terms considering the aggressive actions of Carthage toward Rome. Deferring to the Senate, he instructed the Carthaginians to send ambassadors to

²⁹ Polybius, *Rise*, 418.

³⁰ Livy, *War with Hannibal*, 565.

³¹ Scullard, *Scipio*, 76.

Rome to ask for a treaty under the terms he had specified.³² Although some Roman senators disagreed, the terms were acceptable, and Scipio was instructed to make peace with Carthage "on such terms as he thought fit."³³ The treaty was completed quickly and the terms fulfilled. The Carthaginian ambassadors then returned to Rome and the Roman Senate and People ratified the final treaty, ending the 2nd Punic War. This vignette illustrates Scipio's great respect for the institutions and systems of Roman government. Clearly Scipio viewed himself as carrying out the policy of the Roman State, but did have latitude toward its execution. He had a defining role in making policy. Scipio understood his place within the Roman political system. He worked through it and pushed it sometimes in order to achieve his goals, but he never broke its tenets.

His decisiveness and courage in the face of difficult circumstances is to be lauded. He maximized the resources available to him, and placed the protection of the state above all else. He understood how generosity and compassion applied at the appropriate time and place could pay benefits in the long term. His treatment of Masinissa's nephew in Spain, gave him the cavalry arm he so desperately needed to defeat Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC.

Legates of the Roman Empire

Between Marius' military reforms and Sulla's constitutional changes, the Proconsuls became the real powerbrokers within the Roman Republic. They were constantly vying for power and control within the Senate and seeking to further their power any chance they could. Their military and political clout within and outside of Rome provided them the opportunity to assume more and more power.

³² Scullard, *Scipio*, 159.

³³ *Ibid.*, 160.

Gnaeus Pompey, Marcus Licinius Crassus, and Gaius Julius Caesar formed the First Triumvirate in 60 BC, in order to circumvent the power of the Senate. They succeeded in humbling the Senate, and the Roman Civil Wars were the direct result of their desire for power. The Civil Wars did not end with Julius Caesar's assassination, but finally ended with Octavian Caesar's victory over Marc Antony, at Actium in 31 BC. The Roman Republic effectively ended at this time also. Octavian assumed the title of Augustus (meaning majestic) Caesar.³⁴ Augustus consolidated his power by extending the concept and power of the *Imperator* (commander-in-chief), but first he provided a slight twist to the title of Proconsul.

In 23 BC, Augustus caused the Senate to give him the Proconsulship over the whole extent of the Roman state, with Italy and the Senatorial provinces included. He used the *maius imperium* (wider in both territorial extent and in competence) which the Senate itself had extended during the Republic to Pompey, and after the murder of Caesar, on Brutus and Cassius for the whole East. So the Proconsulship, a more practical and infinitely more elastic legal form, took the place of the Consulship as the fundamental and permanent basis of the Emperor's power. Assuming the title of *Tribune* (political representative) for life cemented his political power in Italy. He also assumed the title of *Princeps Senatus* (Leading Senator) and *Princeps* (Leading man)³⁵, further solidifying his power. These titles consolidated all the legislative, judicial, and military power necessary to rule the empire.³⁶

³⁴ Michael Grant, *The Army of the Caesars* (New York: Evans, 1993), 41.

³⁵ John Warry, *Warfare in the Classical World* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 189.

³⁶ Homo, 214.

Augustus was determined to reorganize the provincial governments to make the provinces feel more a part of Rome and the empire. He began a series of actions to ensure more efficient government within the provinces and end the corruption and extortion that existed during the better part of the Republic. A better census was taken and proper taxation was enacted throughout the empire. Taxation was even begun, for the first time, within Italy. Augustus also traveled extensively throughout the empire to show the provinces they were important to him.³⁷

The power in Rome was supposedly still with the Senate, the Assemblies and the Consuls, but the Emperor was the real power. He controlled the majority of the army. By virtue of his Proconsular imperium, and his Tribunician power, he possessed all the civil, military, and judicial power throughout the empire. He did try to retain some of the old Republic institutions.

Officially, by the allotment of 27 BC, the provinces were divided into two classes-- the Senatorial provinces, which by definition were those already pacified, the administration was kept by the Senate, and the Imperial provinces, those in which troops were stationed, the government of which the Emperor reserved for himself, being represented by direct agents, the Legates (*Legate pro praetore*).³⁸

The governors of the ten Senatorial provinces were selected from members of the Senate. Macedonia and Africa were Proconsular appointments since they commanded five or six legions between them³⁹, and the other eight were Praetorian appointments. No matter what their rank was, all bore the title of Proconsul. These Senatorial governors were purely civil officials and were usually appointed for one-year terms. Except for Macedonia and Africa, they did not possess military or judicial powers.⁴⁰

³⁷ Taylor, 464.

³⁸ Homo, 216.

³⁹ Grant, 41.

⁴⁰ Homo, 316.

The governors of the seven imperial provinces were also selected from the Senate, but their powers were radically different. They answered directly to the Emperor, and exercised his full *imperium* powers within their province. Men of consular rank governed the more important provinces and the lesser important provinces had governors of praetorian rank.⁴¹

He governed the district, managing finances (allotment of taxation, centralization of revenues, authorization of expenditure), the food-supply, public works, and posts, and controlling the working of municipal government in the towns. He commanded the land and sea forces, and if necessary led them against the enemy. In the criminal courts, in virtue of the "right of the sword", he had the right of life and death over all the inhabitants of the province. In the civil courts, he tried all cases, which were outside the competence of the municipal magistracies; the only appeal in either case was to the Emperor.⁴²

In 23 BC, the Emperor's power was extended to the Senatorial provinces as well, by constitutional act. This allowed him to choose governors and exercise judicial jurisdiction over the province if he so desired. Over the next century, the balance of ten Senatorial and seven Imperial provinces disappeared. By 117 AD, there were eleven Senatorial provinces, and thirty-three Imperial provinces. The balance of power had shifted to the Emperor for good. The Emperor also had the power to proclaim a Senatorial province an Imperial province if a civil war or foreign invasion occurred within the province. This occurred frequently, but another Imperial province would be designated a Senatorial Province in return.⁴³

During the reign of Gallienus in the third century AD, major barbarian invasions forced him to declare all Senatorial provinces as Imperial provinces, in order to conduct military operations to drive out the invaders. At the same time, he stripped the Senate of

⁴¹ Homo, 316.

⁴² Ibid., 224.

⁴³ Ibid., 317.

any power to appoint provincial governors, reserving that right for him. Emperor Tacitus repealed the law during his reign, but Diocletian reversed the law again in the final years of the third century AD. From then on, the Emperor appointed all provincial governors himself.⁴⁴

Understanding the characteristics, ideas, and systems that made Legates effective during the Empire will also provide a basis of comparison with the CINCs. Gnaeus Julius Agricola in Aquitane and Britain during the reign of the Emperors' Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian during the height of the Roman Empire will be the second subject of analysis.

Gnaeus Julius Agricola

Agricola was born in 40 AD. His name means 'farmer', since it was one of his father's passions at the time. Agricola's father, Lucius Julius Graenicus, had been a Senator who had fallen out of favor with the Emperor Gaius Caligula. Caligula had asked Graenicus to prosecute another senator illegally, because Caligula suspected the man of conspiring against him. Graenicus refused and fell out of favor with the Emperor. While Agricola was still a boy, Caligula murdered Graenicus for no apparent reason than his own mad conspiracy theories. Growing up, Agricola's mother strove to instill a sense of duty and honor within him. People, who knew his father, helped Agricola become a military Tribune (Roman officer in the Army) in Britain when he became of age. "The role of the Tribunes was to act as administrative assistants or advisers to the Legate, and they held no definite military command, (say) over individual cohorts."⁴⁵ His social presence and refinement also lead the Emperor Vespasian to bestow on him Patrician status after his many years of loyal and honorable service.

⁴⁴ Homo, 341.

⁴⁵ Lawrence Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 176.

After this promotion in status, Vespasian gave him the governorship of Aquitane in 74 AD. This appointment showed that Vespasian had great trust and respect for Agricola, because the governorship of Aquitane was considered one of the best Imperial provinces. It usually led to an early election as Consul of Rome. Agricola was on his way to greater responsibility and authority.⁴⁶ A. R. Burn writes of Aquitane and Agricola's title.

Like all Gaul, except the Old Province [Transalpine Gaul], and like all the other less civilized or frontier districts of the empire, it was one of "Caesar's provinces"; part of the vast "province" or sphere of action which his faithful senators had made over to Augustus at the end of the revolutionary period. The governor's title therefore was not Proconsul but Legate--in full, "Legate of Augustus." The Proconsul was the Emperor himself.⁴⁷

Aquitane was fairly secure. The possibility of uprisings or military conflict was remote, and the native authorities policed the people of Aquitane. The Roman Army of the Rhine was the governor's power base if conflict did erupt or military action became necessary. To Agricola, the most important job during his governorship was conducting the civil and judicial work within his province well. Failure to conduct this properly in the eyes of the Emperor would lead to the end of his career.⁴⁸

The work of any governor in a province like Aquitane was largely judicial. Any criminal case involving a capital sentence was the responsibility of the Roman governor to judge. He, by virtue of his imperium, was the only person allowed to sentence a person to death. Many civil cases were also his responsibility to judge. He had a large body of previously judged cases in a library, from which to draw on, as well as his own good common sense. If nothing could be found to represent previous judgements, he would

⁴⁶ Andrew Burn, *Agricola and Roman Britain* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 88.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 90.

have to "make do."⁴⁹ If he was still in a quandary, he could send to Rome and ask the Emperor's judgement on the case. The Emperor, especially Vespasian, had so many other things to do however; he liked his Legates to make decisions themselves.

Along with the legal requirements of the job, Agricola busied himself with inspecting new public roads, buildings, and bridges. He traveled ceaselessly throughout the summer months. Similar to the ribbon cutting ceremonies of today, the governor would declare bridges and roads fit for traffic or open a new building for occupation. He would also accept the hospitality of Gallic chieftains or councilors as he traveled. His most important job however, as Burn writes,

"Above all, it was a governor's business to encourage all tendencies that made for Romanization; especially the official cult of "Rome and the Emperor," which had sprung up in the east spontaneously in the days of Augustus, the restorer of peace after the great civil wars, and had been officially encouraged as the only spiritual bond of union in the far-flung and polyglot empire."⁵⁰

Agricola's major accomplishment during his tenure as governor of Aquitaine was avoiding inter-departmental quarrels. He strove to maintain a sense of respect and equality between himself and the governors of the other Gallic provinces, Lugdunensis, and Belgica. Disagreements between him and the finance officials were solved quickly and with much tact and forethought. The financial officials still served as a check against any ambitious generals of governors, by reporting back to the Emperor immediately. Agricola's good common sense and even temper allowed him to steer clear of any problems.⁵¹ Burn writes, "He did not demand credit for everything, and as for

⁴⁹ Burn, 90.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 91.

⁵¹ Ibid., 93.

departmental feuds, he considered that in them there was no glory in victory and only squalor in defeat.⁵²

Less than three years in Aquitaine and Agricola was informed he was being replaced. Three years was the usual amount of time a governor spent in an Imperial province. This was a good sign for Agricola because at the same time, he was instructed to appear in Rome and stand for election to the consulship. In 78 AD he was elected, and only held the office for three months before being assigned as the governor of Britain. He left for Britain that same year and was the Legate of Britain from 78 through 84 AD.⁵³

In late summer, Agricola arrived in Britain. Most troops had begun preparing for winter quarters because they thought the new governor would want to travel the province to get a feel for the situation and make speeches of introduction. They were wrong because events occurred that required prompt action before winter. The Ordovices had taken up arms against the Romans. A Roman cavalry unit had been caught in a mountain pass and virtually destroyed. This buoyed the spirits of the other recently conquered tribes in the area, and if action was not taken quickly, Agricola could find himself fighting for the same territory they had already conquered. He was not going to let that happen.⁵⁴

He knew the strength of the Ordovices was not that large, but he needed to act fast. Speed and decisive action was needed. Burn writes,

He wrote, probably from London, to his legion commanders for detachments, which could be sent off much more easily than the main body of the legions, to concentrate at some suitable point. With these detachments (probably 2,000 men from each legion) and with such cavalry and light infantry as could be most easily

⁵² Burn, 93.

⁵³ Ibid., 95.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 97.

concentrated, he pushed rapidly westwards, and within a few weeks of landing he brought the hillmen to bay.⁵⁵

With this quick and decisive defeat, Agricola finished the conquest of Wales. It remained peaceful for many years to come.

With winter approaching, Agricola set out to renovate the civil administration of the province. Abuses were rampant within the administration, and these abuses were leading to many conflicts with the recently conquered peoples. Burn writes of Agricola, "Knowing the British character, and having learned through the experience of former governors that force could effect little if followed by injustice, he set himself to get rid of the causes of war."⁵⁶ One of the main problems dealt with the levies on the natives in cash or kind, especially grain, for the use by the Roman Army. Many camp commanders and senior centurions were extorting the natives through a very profitable racket involving grain payments. Threats and deception were the principal methods of extorting these payments. Agricola disciplined the offenders heavily that first winter, and the situation was corrected by the following spring. He even disciplined his own staff for any attempts to curry favor with anyone or himself. He paid strict attention to appointments made and tried to select the most qualified and respected men for positions of authority. His motto was, "The best man in general, will be the most loyal."⁵⁷

By providing a just and proper environment in his rear area, Agricola was able to extend his influence to tribes that submitted by promising them a just and tolerable peace under Roman rule. In the spring of 79 AD, Agricola continued to attack north with his

⁵⁵ Burn, 98.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 99.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 101.

flying legionary columns. When he had defeated a new tribe, he forgave them and show them the benefits of peace, to which most complied readily. Burn writes,

Under these inducements many states, which had hitherto treated [with the empire] on equal terms, gave hostages, laid aside their hostility, and were encircled with forts; and this was done so carefully and methodically that no new part of Britain was ever won over after so little harrying.⁵⁸

The next winter, Agricola focused his efforts on expanding the Romanization of Britain as he had done in Aquitane. Some British families were Roman citizens already, but circumstances were right for an increased rate of Romanization. Local governments in the south were under native control and Agricola was prompting them to better themselves. He stressed building of temples, town centers, and private houses. He encouraged the native chiefs to begin the literary education their children. Latin fast became the preferred language of the elite. While he focused on Romanization of the natives, he still was attuned to any racketeering or extortion of natives by Roman commanders or centurions. Any Romans found guilty were severely punished.

Agricola finished his governorship of Britain in 84 AD. Domitian had become Emperor by this time, and was considered a tyrant. He suspected numerous people of conspiring against him, but Agricola seemed to meet with the Emperor's approval. He was recalled to Rome and served out the rest of his life as a private citizen, since he was never given another governorship, although rumors persisted until he died in August 93 AD. His son-in-law, Tacitus, is quoted by Burn saying,

So passed a man who had fought abuses and done his best with what he had; a man who lived more usefully than leaders of ineffective conspiratorial resistance, and whose work and loyalty had taught the lesson "that great men can exist even under bad emperors."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Burn, 104.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 170.

In comparison, while Scipio followed the overall direction of the Senate, he had more political/diplomatic latitude and more freedom to act during the Republic. Agricola was answerable only to the Emperor, not the Senate. Policy was more controlled. Yet in both cases, each man answered to a form of National Command Authority.

After the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century AD, the Roman Proconsuls disappeared from the international scene in name only. The combining of civil, judicial, and military power continued with the Feudal Lords of the Middle Ages through to the 18th century. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries however, the dawn of modern warfare created a gap that would change civil-military relations, especially in the fledgling Republic of the United States of America. The Romans would figure prominently also.

CHAPTER TWO

DIVERGENCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

The Founding Fathers of the United States of America read and understood the authors of antiquity. During the debates about the principles and ideas of forming a viable constitution for the fledgling Republic of the United States of America, the Founding Fathers relied on the history of Rome to provide them the historical basis for drafting our constitution. Historian Marshall Lloyd writes,

Like the Americans, the Romans had ridded themselves of a tyrant and were contemplating the best form of constitution. Rome sent a delegation of three men to Greece to study the laws of Solon, Lycurgus, and Greek institutions....Influenced by the Greeks; their government embraced a mixed constitution. In like manner the Founding Fathers, having expelled the tyrant George III, consulted the history books to find the best that foreign lands had to offer in constitutional theory. They found separation of powers within a mixed constitution.⁶⁰

The Greek historian, Polybius, famous for his *Histories* of the Roman Republic, was instrumental in influencing the Founding Fathers. According to Lloyd, "A brief survey of the papers of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Benjamin Franklin, James Otis, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton will show that many of the Founding Fathers indeed knew Polybius, especially his passages on the Roman Constitution, and the separation of powers."⁶¹

The separation of powers was important to the United States constitution. The failures of the Roman constitution to adequately protect the system from corruption lead

⁶⁰ Marshall D. Lloyd, "Polybius and the Founding Fathers: the separation of powers." Database on-line. Available from <http://www.sms.org/mdl-idx/polybius/polybius.htm>. Internet. Accessed 9 January 2001, 5.

⁶¹ Ibid., 6.

to the downfall of the Republic and the Civil Wars of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. The proper control of the military was one of the key factors in the separation of power issues.

In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton writes, “The President is to be the “Commander in Chief of the army and the navy of the United States.”⁶² “Congress not the President has the final authority to determine the size and composition of the armed forces. The powers of Congress to “raise and support armies” and to “provide and maintain a navy” are positive powers not limited to establishing a ceiling on the services”, according to Samuel Huntington.⁶³ The Founding Fathers of the United States had read the ancient authors and studied the history of Rome’s political system. They used the Roman experiences to determine what was the best political course for the U.S. Republic to follow in order to achieve the balance that the Roman Republic failed to maintain over the course of its existence.

At the end of the American Revolution, Washington established a precedent by not accepting a “Kingship” from the people, and preferring to retire to civilian life. He was considered the most powerful man in the country, and could have secured power very easily for himself after the American victory over the British.

Also during this time, changes in warfare were widening the gap between civil and military leaders. The idea of being a military professional was rising. Huntington writes,

The growth of population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of technology, the beginnings of industrialism, and the rise of urbanism-- all contributed to increased functional specialization and division of labor. War, like everything else, was no longer a simple, uncomplicated affair. Armies were larger, and, more important, were composed of increasingly diverse elements. Once,

⁶² Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Bantam Books Classic, 1982), 349.

⁶³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 427.

all the men in a military force had performed the same function: engaging the enemy with spears or swords as the case might be. Now armies and navies became complex organisms, embodying hundreds of different specialties, creating the need for still another type of specialist: the specialist in coordinating and directing these diverse parts to their assigned goal. No longer was it possible to master this skill while still remaining competent in many other fields. Most particularly, it became impossible to be an expert in the management of violence for external defense and at the same time to be skilled in either politics and statecraft or the use of force for the maintenance of internal order. The functions of the officer became distinct from those of the politician and policeman. Technological specialization was more or less equally present throughout the West.⁶⁴

Modern war had made it almost impossible for a civil leader to operationally command a country's Armed forces. The specialization required and the complexity involved dictated an increasing divergence of civil-military relations.

Clausewitz on War and Policy

Many theorists had begun writing about the art and science of modern war in the early nineteenth century. One of the most influential was Carl von Clausewitz. His ideas on government policy and war are very telling. He addressed the divergence of civil and military relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He wrote, "It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics-- the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own."⁶⁵ This assumption is made repeatedly by uninformed "experts" within governments around the world today. Many believe war to be the domain of the soldier, which is furthest from the truth.

But Clausewitz reminded soldiers and politicians alike that war and politics are one in the same. He wrote,

⁶⁴ Huntington, 32.

⁶⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.⁶⁶

He summarized this statement by stating, "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."⁶⁷ Clausewitz uses the phrase; "carried on with other means" to illustrate that political discussions and negotiations do not cease once battle has begun.

Clausewitz wrote,

The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace... If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.⁶⁸

It is essential for the military and political leaders of the United States to understand that there is no difference between war and policy. One is the other.

How coherent the national strategy is for dealing with a global or regional issue is critical for finding the right balance in the end. The primacy of politics over military necessity is essential within this relationship. Military senior leaders that understand the national policies and help by shaping the environment militarily will benefit the U.S. in the long term. According to Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, the military understands this dynamic. It states that "the Armed Forces of the United States operate in a democratic political context that enables the American

⁶⁶ Clausewitz, 87.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 605.

people to express their views and preferences about the employment of military forces."⁶⁹

Likewise, political leaders that understand a small amount about military matters can help ensure a coherent strategy is developed that maximizes the strengths of all the instrument of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic).

U.S. Theater CINCs are the lead military agents to help militarily shape the international environment to benefit the United States. The next chapter will trace the genesis and evolution of the CINCs.

⁶⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), I-4.

CHAPTER THREE

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE MODERN ERA U.S. CINC

The increasing complexity of warfare and the rising professionalism of military officers continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. During World War II, new organizations and structures within the United States National Security establishment would again place the balance of civil/military relations at crossroads.

The Unified Command Plan

Unified Commands were established along the lines of the Combined U.S.-British command structure lead by General Eisenhower during World War II. Unified command called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service. The JCS wanted to continue this unified command system during peacetime. Soon after Victory-in-Europe (V-E) Day in June 1945, a JCS directive was issued appointing General Eisenhower as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater (CG, USFET). Problems arose in the Pacific theater between the Army and Navy concerning General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz. Neither Service wanted to subordinate one under the other.⁷⁰

The first unified command plan came about because of the inability of the JCS to rectify the command situation within the Pacific Theater. Seven Unified commands were established after the negotiating and compromising was completed between the various services. The JCS would exercise strategic control over all elements of the Armed Forces.

⁷⁰ Ronald H. Cole, et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 11.

They would assign forces to each command and prescribe the missions and tasks of those commands.⁷¹ Each command would operate under a designated Service chief, and the Services would control all forces not assigned to Unified commands.⁷²

The passing of the National Security Act of 1947 was the first in a series of attempts to reorganize and coordinate the defense of U.S. national interest in the post-World War II era.⁷³ It legitimized the existence of the JCS and cemented their responsibility for establishing unified commands around the world. It also affirmed that they were under the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense.⁷⁴ The position of CINC was officially established also.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 amended the National Security Act of 1947. The law changed to the President being the only person authorized to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions and to determine their force structure. The JCS would provide advice to the President. The intent of the law was to streamline the command structure from the President to the unified commanders. Services no longer were in the command structure. The JCS staff would serve as the Secretary of Defense's staff now.⁷⁵

Between 1958 and 1986, many changes occurred within the Unified Command Plan. Commands changed names, some were expanded, some were disbanded, but the most significant change occurred with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

⁷¹ Cole, 13.

⁷² Ibid., 14.

⁷³ William J. Gregor, "Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs: Understanding the United States Military In the Post Cold-War World." Working paper No. 6 from the *Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1996), 19.

⁷⁴ Cole, 15.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 28.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

The intent of Congress with this Act was:

- (1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department
- (2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands
- (4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands
- (5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning
- (6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources⁷⁶

The CINC's military authority was expanded by this Act. This was done in order to reduce further the influence of service parochialism and better focus Department of Defense strategic planning on the needs of the unified and specified combatant commanders.⁷⁷ CINCs now had the authority to:

- (1) direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics
- (2) prescribe the chain of command
- (3) organize the command and forces within the command
- (4) employ forces as necessary to accomplish the missions assigned
- (5) assign command functions to subordinates
- (6) coordinate and approve administrative support and disciplinary activities to carry out missions
- (7) select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff
- (8) convene courts martial.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, Goldwater-Nichols, 994.

⁷⁷ Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. "The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986: Improving the Department through Centralization and Integration." In *Organizing for National Security*, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000), 84.

⁷⁸ U.S. Congress, Goldwater-Nichols, 1014.

Goldwater-Nichols also provided for a review of CINC responsibilities and authority by the Secretary of Defense. It also "gave the CINCs the responsibility to report promptly to the secretary any instances in which they feel their authority to be inadequate."⁷⁹

The Act gave the responsibility to the CINCs to determine what are the appropriate capabilities needed. The Service secretaries were to try and fulfill these requirements as best as possible. This clearly established "the primacy of the CINCs over the Service Chiefs with respect to the determination of required military capabilities."⁸⁰

The CINCs Role in the National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy sets forth three core objectives that are:

- (1) to enhance our security.
- (2) to bolster America's economic prosperity.
- (3) to Promote democracy abroad.⁸¹

The method of achieving these objectives is the nebulous term, Engagement. Engagement entails a need to "lead abroad if the U.S. is to be secure a home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors."⁸²

The driving impetus of the CINCs within the National Security Strategy is the idea of Shaping, which is to set conditions that allow for favorable U.S. actions and policies to thrive in the international arena. This is accomplished primarily through military-to-military contacts and activities.⁸³

⁷⁹ Lovelace, 85.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 86.

⁸¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998), iii.

⁸² Ibid., 1.

⁸³ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

The military activities that help to shape the environment include maintaining an overseas presence, providing security assistance, and conducting combined training exercises with allies and friends.⁸⁴ Maintaining an overseas presence provides a deterrence capability forward and shows potential aggressors that we are serious about maintaining or coalitions and alliances with friends around the world. Deployments of U.S. military forces to areas of conflict signal U.S. intentions to help maintain peace and tranquility around the world. As part of maintaining security abroad, promoting regional stability is a goal within the strategy that the CINCs help to facilitate. This quote from the National Security Strategy illustrates how the CINCs conduct their missions around the world.

U.S. military forces prevent and reduce a wide range of potential conflicts in key regions....We assist other countries in improving their pertinent military capabilities, including peacekeeping and humanitarian response. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known forces, military cooperation often serves as a positive means of engagement, building security relationships today that will contribute to improved relations tomorrow.⁸⁵

The new international security environment is dynamic and uncertain, with recurring disputes, crises, and conflicts in many regions and endemic conflicts in regions of particular importance to the security of the United States.⁸⁶ The United States' unique position as the last remaining superpower provides us with an opportunity to "foster a global system that advances freedom, peace, and prosperity for Americans and the world."⁸⁷

⁸⁴ The White House, 12.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁸⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1*, vii.

⁸⁷ Patrick M. Cronin, *Adapting to the New National Security Environment* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 64, 1 December 2000), 1.

CINCs have an important role to execute in order to achieve this desired endstate for the United States. CINCs are integrated in a regional manner around the world. The five regional commands are the United States Southern, Joint Forces, European, Central and Pacific Commands (Figure 1).⁸⁸




Figure 1

They use Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) to illustrate the methods of engagement they will focus on throughout their region of the world. The TEPs look out seven years, and are coordinated with the U.S. Ambassadors of the various countries in the region.⁸⁹ How effective they are in implementing their TEPs is a large determiner of their effectiveness. Understanding how the CINCs operate is essential to comparing them to effective Roman Proconsuls. Two former U.S. Theater CINCs have provided comments to give a basis of

⁸⁸ Unified Command Plan, "Geographic Areas of Responsibility map", Database on-line. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unified/allcom1.html>. Internet. Accessed 16 April 2001.

⁸⁹ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

comparison of the similarities and differences of the modern U.S. Theater CINCs to ancient Roman Proconsuls.

A Modern Four-star Viewpoint

General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni, former CINC, U.S. Central Command, and General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, former CINC, U.S. Southern Command provided comments on what makes CINCs effective on an individual level and a systemic level within the U.S. government.

Both immediately highlighted the difference that the Romans were occupiers of conquered territory, the U.S. is not. General Zinni held that, "While the Roman Empire was built through conquest, the "American Empire" is built through influence."⁹⁰ While the ends may be the same, the ways and means associated with maintaining each is vastly different.

General McCaffrey stipulated that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is the basis for the CINC's authority.⁹¹ CINCs are only in charge of U.S. Armed Forces operating within their region, and only if the Secretary of Defense authorizes them to have forces within their region.⁹² Civilian control of the military is paramount.

Both generals reiterated that the CINCs focus is primarily military-to-military contacts. General Zinni added that CINCs focus had stretched beyond that in the last years because there is no regional civilian counterpart within the other department of the U.S. government (State, Justice, Treasury, etc). This lack of diplomatic/judicial

⁹⁰ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

⁹¹ General (Retired) Barry R. McCaffrey, interview by author, 5 April 2001, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, telephone conversation, U.S. Command and General staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1.

⁹² Ibid.

integration within the region makes the CINCs better recognized within the regions.⁹³ At times, separating military contacts from the civil contacts is not always possible according to General Zinni. Sometimes the military is the government, so the CINC does become involved in government action. The CINC still tries to focus on the military aspects of government business, however. If asked by the NCA, however, CINCs may become involved in diplomatic issues. For example, when Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup and took control of the country, President Clinton asked General Zinni to travel to Pakistan as the U.S. representative and talk about the situation.⁹⁴ General McCaffrey made a point to reiterate that CINCs are non-political members of the U.S. government.⁹⁵

General McCaffrey spoke of the U.S. inability to think and coordinate a coherent and rational U.S. National Security Strategy. This incoherent strategy makes the CINCs more influential within their region also. The State Department, while having some of the smartest individuals within the U.S. government working for it, is not structured to fully integrate the efforts of the group collectively. U.S. Ambassadors view themselves as working directly for the President and accept taskings normally only from someone speaking with the direct authority of an Undersecretary or higher. In many cases they will not coordinate with a fellow ambassador on a common problem.⁹⁶ This lack of horizontal coordination leads to disjointed strategies.

Not only is the State Department structure disjointed, but the interagency process is also disjointed. General Zinni states that no one is in charge and this leads to disjointed

⁹³ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ McCaffrey, 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 4.

strategies for dealing with regional issues. The U.S. needs detailed strategies to deal with these various issues. When a policy gap does develop, the CINCs fill the void as best they can.⁹⁷

Both generals stated that the CINCs strength within each region is based on the regional approach to dealing with issues and crises. General McCaffrey said the CINC's regionally oriented, coherent, and loyal 900+ person staff, provides a more balanced approach and better cooperation across the military spectrum. It affords the CINCs more flexibility to deal with regional issues.⁹⁸ The CINCs involvement in other quasi-military functions such as hosting environmental conferences for the region tends to strengthen the CINCs role within the region. While conferences such as these are not generally thought of as a military function, they can have military effects. Hence, the CINCs need to be involved.⁹⁹

The CINCs also have a bevy of advisors that support their mission. The Foreign Policy Advisors were the CINCs closest advisors. Their Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was also important, and helped with Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for contingency operations. Many other types of agreements were made which required constant SJA oversight.¹⁰⁰ The CINCs high profile position required a dedicated and capable Public Affairs officer (PAO) also. The CINCs relied heavily on their PAO for assistance. Another means of assistance was provided by the Security Assistance and Foreign Area Officers (FAO) within the U.S. embassies within

⁹⁷ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

⁹⁸ McCaffrey, 2.

⁹⁹ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

the region. The CINCs used these individuals as his eyes and ears forward. They provided great assistance in analyzing issues and problems.¹⁰¹

CINCs do face challenges obtaining resources. Contrary to the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, CINCs own no forces or resources. All resources are controlled by the Services. CINCs may develop an engagement plan for a country or the region, but the resources necessary to implement the plan usually come from the Services.¹⁰² In another interview, General Zinni stated, "Sometimes that [a requirement] is unplanned or upsets planning. But we try not to put unnecessary demands on other CINCs or the Services."¹⁰³ Since resources have been extremely scaled back in the recent decade, maximizing the use of these limited resources around the world is critical. This is a difficult balance act that must be properly coordinated for the benefit of U.S. national security.

CINCs are also inundated with tons of oversight. The Department of Defense Inspector General, as well as the U.S. Congress provides oversight of all CINCs. Congress conducts periodic visits to the CINCs headquarters and around the region. Congress also requires the CINCs to provide briefings on Capitol Hill on the situation within each region. CINCs must report to the White House on the average of two to five times each year to brief the National Command Authority (NCA).¹⁰⁴

While the CINCs chain-of-command has been streamlined to the highest levels of the U.S. government by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it still allows for an abundant

¹⁰¹ Zinni, interview by author, 2.

¹⁰² Ibid., 1.

¹⁰³ General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni, "Challenges in the Central Region," An interview with Anthony C. Zinni, *Joint Force Quarterly* Number 24 (Spring 2000), 29.

¹⁰⁴ McCaffrey, 3.

amount of oversight by Congress and the Department of Defense. CINCs can only operate within the boundaries established by their civilian masters. Any failure to overwatch CINC activities is not the CINCs, it is the systems.

On a personal level, U.S. CINCs have much better opportunities to get more education and improve their knowledge of the region. Most have served in the region before, and have a least six years of post-graduate education. These advantages coupled with a high energy level and work ethic give the CINCs a distinct advantage over their civilian counterparts, when associating with foreign government officials within the regions.¹⁰⁵

CINCs must also be decisive. When asked whether the instantaneous communications of today eliminated the need to be decisive, General Zinni commented that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS wanted the CINCs to make decisions and not call back to Washington every five minutes for guidance. They wanted the CINCs to call only if absolutely imperative.¹⁰⁶ If Washington needed to talk to the CINC, they would call.

The CINCs also try to instill the universal values of basic human rights and freedoms within their regions, but CINCs must also be culturally aware. They can't expect to Americanize the region. They must respect and appreciate other cultures, and follow the culture's protocols. Failure to show respect for other cultures could drive a wedge between the U.S. and the other country.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ McCaffrey, 3.

¹⁰⁶ Zinni, interview by author, 1.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

CINCs are very important to America's post Cold-War position within the world structure. Their ability to present a positive image of the U.S. and help shape the environment toward favorable conditions to expand U.S. power and influence will be critical for ensuring America's continued preeminence as the sole superpower in the world.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSIONS

The statement by General (Retired) Anthony Zinni, "While the Roman Empire was built through conquest, the "American Empire" is built through influence.", highlights the significant differences between the Roman Proconsul and the U.S. Theater CINC. The ways and means associated with maintaining each is vastly different. This chapter will focus first on the similarities, and then the differences between effective Roman Proconsuls and effective modern-era U.S. Theater CINCs.

The similarities begin with the creation of the positions. Both the office of Roman Proconsul and the position of U.S. Theater CINC were born out of war, and the need to continue military campaigns. Roman Proconsuls were sent to increase the power and influence of Rome through a systematic Romanization of their provinces in order to ensure provincial loyalty to Rome and/or the Emperor. The need to continue and increase U.S. engagement after World War II necessitated the creation of the CINC position. The U.S. could no longer maintain an isolationist view of the world.

The most important personal attribute for effective Roman Proconsuls was decisiveness in their actions. They did not have the ability to contact Rome instantly, and had to rely on their own common sense and judgment. They understood the benefits of good civil relations and administration, and chose to act according to the law. A large determining factor in their success as a Proconsul was how well they managed the civil and judicial functions within their province. They were excellent warriors and generals, but knew the sword should be the last line of defense and worked diligently to ensure all matters were handled in a civil manner.

Effective Proconsuls were also honorable men. They had to understand the law of Rome and apply it fairly and equitably to all parties, regardless of ethnicity. Those Proconsuls that abused their power produced more problems than benefits for Rome. The Proconsuls that understood their place within the government and acted justly, served Rome well. Scipio's example of deference to the Senate and People of Rome, after his victory over Hannibal, should be noted. At a time when his popularity and power were highest, he ensured that the Senate and People of Rome were responsible for dictating and ratifying the treaty with Carthage.

Effective U.S. Theater CINCs must also be decisive in their actions. Even with modern means of instantaneous communications with Washington, DC, they still must use their own common sense and judgment. They must also understand the benefits of good civil relations and administration, and chose to act according to international law. They also recognize that the sword should be the last line of defense.

Effective CINCs must also be honorable men. Lying and acting unprofessionally will destroy any chance a CINC has of influencing other countries or leaders within his region. As General Zinni said, "the "American Empire" is built on influence." This is a tenuous platform with which to build an Empire, and the slightest deceit on the CINCs part could bring it down.

The Proconsuls of Rome had a very important role in the further expansion of Roman power and influence. As the territory of Rome increased, the success of the Proconsuls meant that Roman power and influence would increase and become stronger in the process. Failure meant the demise of power and influence in the region.

CINCs also play an important role for the U.S. on the world stage. They are the military representatives of the U.S. government. Since the U.S. became the sole remaining superpower, they have been key in helping to maintain U.S. power and influence around the world. Success or failure on their part in military-to-military contacts around the world, will either increase or decrease the power and influence of the United States.

While Republican Proconsuls enjoyed little oversight into their operations or methods of governing their province, effective Proconsuls like Scipio followed Senate policy guidance for the benefit of the State instead of his own personal glory.

During the Empire, each Imperial Legate like Agricola, was personally selected by the Emperor to ensure his loyalty and ability. Each Legate answered only to the Emperor, very similar to the CINCs. The less an Emperor heard about a province, the better. A stable and secure environment within the province measured success. Legates spent most of their time in administrative or judicial duties, and very little time on military activities. Legates during the Empire followed policy and are more similar to modern-era CINCs.

Another significant similarity is the personal make-up of effective Proconsuls and CINCs. Each individual was intelligent, well educated, and possessed a high energy level and work ethic. Each was trained to conduct the mission each was sent to accomplish. Proconsuls had significant political skill through their rise in the *Cursus Honorum* and generally had military service in their background. CINCs had many gates to pass through during their military career, and had served within their theater prior to assuming command.

In analyzing these similarities, the majority of them involved individual attributes and characteristics. The differences however, are more systemic than personal. If one would weight which is more important to U.S. power and influence in the world, the differences far outweigh the similarities.

Roman Proconsuls were politicians first and foremost. In order to achieve the position as Proconsul, the individual had to rise through the offices of the *Cursus Honorum*. The Roman system was very structured. Scipio Africanus notwithstanding, most Roman Proconsuls had to serve many years within the *Cursus Honorum* before attaining the position of Consul, then Proconsul. Proconsuls also possessed unlimited power within their province. By virtue of his *imperium*, the Proconsul controlled all the instruments of power within the province by combining the political, judicial, and military function. He was the chief magistrate and commander-in-chief of the military forces within his designated province. This made him extremely effective.

CINCs however, are non-political members of the U.S. government, and do not possess the political and judicial power that Roman Proconsuls possessed. The divergence of civil-military relations in the 18th and 19th centuries ensured civilian control of the military within the United States. This civilian authority, as dictated in the U.S. Constitution and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, limits the power of the CINCs. The CINCs would need control over the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) in order to achieve the level of effectiveness that Roman Proconsuls enjoyed.

CINCs must have knowledge and an understanding of U.S. foreign policy, in order to shape the conditions that allow for U.S. policy to thrive on the international

stage, but again, they are not policy decision-makers. They still serve their civilian masters as stipulated in the U.S. Constitution and other laws. U.S. Armed Forces are only under CINC command if granted by the President and Secretary of Defense. Forces can be taken away at any time they deem necessary. There is no chance of an U.S. CINC conducting military operations or civil actions without the approval of the President and Secretary of Defense.

It is important to understand that the provinces of Rome were conquered territories governed by Romans. The Roman Proconsuls not only governed the province and commanded the legions, but Romanized the province to ensure its loyalty to Rome during the Republican period, and the Emperor, during the imperial period. Most Roman Proconsuls spent the majority of their time Romanizing the provinces. Conducting military campaigns did take a portion of their time, but how successful the Romanization process was usually the measure of success for a Proconsul.

CINCs differ from the Romans in that they can't expect to Americanize the region. They must respect and appreciate other cultures, and follow the culture's protocols. They are not occupying conquered territory as the Romans were. Failure to show respect for other cultures could drive a wedge between the U.S. and the other country. This is a different dynamic that is difficult for the CINCs to balance, along with the desire to shape another country's values and ideals in line with ours.

If the U.S. is to maximize its power and influence in the coming years, the CINCs will have an important role to play. Operating within the current system, CINCs are maximizing their effectiveness. Any problems with maintaining U.S. influence in the world can not be blamed on the CINCs. The problems will occur in the U.S. national

security establishment, which needs to be restructured in order to maximize its effectiveness.

The combining of all the instruments of national power within the Proconsuls served Rome well. The U.S. system of civilian control of the military will prevent that from ever happening. What is needed, is a revitalization of the entire National Security Structure and Strategy, fully integrating all the instruments of national power for the benefit of the U.S. and the world. Only then can we expect to "foster a global system that advances freedom, peace, and prosperity for Americans and the world,"¹⁰⁸ and reap the benefits of the Pax Americana.

¹⁰⁸ Cronin, 1.

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